We present assessments for a number of previously proposed theories of action and change as well as some new ones. Each assessment identi es a class of scenarios for temporal reasoning where the theory is guaranteed to obtain the correct results. For some of the theories we have also obtained upper-bound results on the range of correct applicability. The theories and the their validation criteria use a logic with explicit integer time, and has been generalized to linear and branching metric time. The assessments show how the correctness of each theory depends on factors such as whether actions are deterministic, whether scenarios involve prediction only, or what is the behavior of each type of action within its execution period. The paper describes equally the methodology that has been used for obtaining the assessments, and the assessments themselves.
1 Theories of action and change: a methodology for assessment
There has been much research in recent years on methods for reasoning about actions and change, and on nding solutions of the so-called \frame problems". New variants of nonmonotonic logics for common-sense reasoning have been proposed, only to be quickly refuted by counterexamples.
Unfortunately the results that have been obtained in this fashion are notoriously unreliable. According to the standard research methodology in the area, the evidence in favor of a proposed logic or theory should consist of intuitive plausibility arguments and a small number of scenario examples for which the theory is proven (or claimed) to give the intended conclusions and no others. This prevailing methodology was summarized by Davis 6] as follows:
The basic approach used here, as in much of the research on automating commonsense reasoning, is to take a number of examples of commonsense inference in a commonsense domain, generally deductive inference; identify the general domain knowledge and the particular problem speci cation used in the inference; develop a formal language in which this knowledge can be expressed; and de ne the primitives of the language as carefully and precisely as possible... This methodology has been e ective for identifying a range of important problems, such as the quali cation and rami cation problems. However since it relies on examples, it is not su cient for obtaining reliable results of a general nature. One also needs to validate a proposed approach and prove that it is correct for the intended type of reasoning about a whole class of scenarios.
Validation of theories of action
The quotation from Davis indicates also how each proposed approach to common-sense reasoning must specify the syntax of its language of logical formulae, the conventions for how to use that language for describing actual scenarios, and the methods for drawing conclusions from a scenario description. I shall use the term theory for such a collection of rules and conventions, and reserve the use of the word logic for the syntax and the formal semantics which may be used by a particular theory or by several theories jointly.
The validation of such a theory must rely on a formal de nition of the function from a scenario description , expressed using logical formulae,
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; ] ]), i.e. as the set of those classical models which are minimal with respect to some preference relation . Many of the proposed theories of action and change have this character.
The work of validating several theories for the same purpose is facilitated considerably if they use the same logic, which I will then call their base logic, as well as the same conventions for scenario description. In this case they can use the same intended-models function, and the validation results can be compared more easily.
In the case of reasoning about actions and change, the scenario description is a chronicle containing statements about the state of the world at various points in time (the observations), about speci c actions and their temporal order (the schedule of actions), as well as action laws de ning the e ects of actions. Models represent possible histories of the world; those models which satisfy all the statements but violate the \frame" assumption of persistence or inertia are classical but unintended models.
Lin and Shoham 19] were probably the rst to report a validation of a previously proposed theory of action. They showed that chronological minimization is correct for prediction in deterministic situation-calculus theories with strict inertia, i.e. no surprises or quali cation, but allowing for rami cation. The assumption of determinism applies for the rami cation side-e ects as well.
A number of later papers have obtained validations of other theories, and often for broader classes of chronicles. The present article, which combines and extends two previous conference papers 32, 33] , reports validation of several theories of action for chronicles with nondeterministic actions and discrete metric time. This includes integer time as a special case, and allows one to represent actions with extended duration, which may be characterized not only in terms of their nal e ects, but also with respect to changes within their interval of duration. It also allows chronicles where the order of the actions is only partially speci ed, like in nonlinear planning 29] . Several of the validations generalize trivially for deterministic rami cation, but rami cation in nondeterministic chronicles is more di cult and has not been addressed.
We have shown in 34] that these results generalize easily to the case of branching metric time as well, but for simplicity the present article addresses the special case of integer time. I share the view on the utility of metric time which is presented by Ferguson and Allen in another article in the present Special Issue.
Other validation results for chronicles in situation calculus with strict inertia have been reported by Lifschitz 17] , Reiter 28] , and Kartha 14] . Validations for theories with rami cation have been reported by Lin and Reiter 18] and by Peppas and Wobcke 25] . Validations for the generalization of situation calculus to theories with concurrent single-timestep actions have been reported by Lin and Shoham 20] and by Baral and Gelfond 3] .
The validation results by these other authors are direct validations, in the sense that they prove that a certain theory of action is correct for all chronicles in a certain class, given a certain validation criterion. However the validations reported in the present article are assessments, which identify the range of correct applicability of each of a number of theories. We initially de ne a relatively large class of chronicles, and assign a taxonomy to it in terms of a number of properties that chronicles may have. The complete assessment of a theory of action consists of both a lower bound and an upper bound. The lower bound is a family of chronicles within the taxonomy for which the theory is provably correct; the upper bound is a family (larger or equal to the lower bound) outside which it is provably impossible that the theory is correct. In this way it has sometimes been possible to identify the exact range of applicability of previously proposed theories of action.
Di erent researchers have also used di erent validation criteria. Lin and Shoham 19] , Lifschitz 17] , and Reiter 28 ] relate a nonmonotonic theory over a certain set of \common-sense" axioms, to a monotonic theory over a larger set of axioms which is assumed to capture the full intentions. In other words, they de ne ( ) as G( )] ], where G is an operation which extends or transforms the given set of logical formulae.
Lifschitz and Gelfond have introduced a separate speci cation language A for de ning the e ects of actions, and used it to de ne the intended conclusions for reasoning about actions 10]. Kartha 14] applied the same criterion to the theories previously proposed by Baker 2] , Pednault 24] , and Reiter 28] . Baral and Gelfond 3] generalized A to the case of concurrent single-timestep actions and used it for validations as well. These two approaches have only been used for direct validation. The work reported here uses an underlying semantics which captures basic notions of intelligent agents, and de nes intended models in its terms. The underlying semantics can be viewed as a kind of abstract simulator of the interaction between an intelligent robot and its environment. It is hoped that this approach will facilitate its use for cognitive robotics as well as for CSR. The immediate bene t, however, is that the underlying semantics made it easy to de ne the chronicle taxonomy that is needed for assessments.
Yet another approach is to constrain the set of intended conclusions through a number of postulates for the relation between ? and (?), or between ?] ] and (?). Del Val and Shoham 7] use the postulates of Katsumo and Mendelzon 15] as the basis, and Peppas and Wobcke 25] use an extended set of postulates for epistemic entrenchment as the basis for the correctness proof for their system. Since postulates are in principle written to constrain the choice of (?) but not to specify it completely, it seems that their use will lead to intrinsically weaker results.
Given this variety of validation criteria one may also consider to what extent they are equivalent and exchangable. A rst step towards such an analysis has been reported by Thielscher 38] , who identi ed the relationship between the A language of Gelfond and Lifschitz and a subset of the underlying semantics that is used in the present paper.
Intended models and common sense
The systematic methodology introduces a two-step process for going from common sense to logic: rst one attempts to capture some characteristics of common sense in terms of a formal de nition of ( ), and then one tries to nd a theory whose selection function S satis es S( ) = ( ). But what is the evidence that a proposed de nition of itself captures common sense reasoning in an adequate manner?
In my view the formalization of common sense can only be achieved as the limiting case in a progression of successively more re ned functions 1 , 2 , and so on. To illustrate the need for several such i , consider the \stolen car scenario", a very simple example of common-sense reasoning originally proposed by Kautz in 16] . In this chronicle it is assumed that if a certain car is left in the garage overnight then it will still be there the next morning. It is also observed that after the car has been left in the garage for two nights, it is no longer there. What are the common-sense conclusions, or equivalently what should be the set ( ) of intended models for this chronicle?
One possible ontology assumes simple persistence without any exceptions or modi cations. I will refer to this case as strict inertia. Then the given chronicle is inconsistent, since the car is supposed to remain in the garage after two nights, but it is also stated not to be there. The set of intended models for the stolen car scenario under strict inertia is therefore empty. Another possible ontology allows persistence to be modi ed by \surprises", and at the same time one makes the epistemological assumption that ( ) must be non-empty except in the case where the set ] ] of classical models is itself empty. The set of surprises is minimized subject to the restriction ( ) 6 = ?. In this case the given chronicle has two intended models: one where the car vanishes surprisingly during the rst night, and one where the car vanishes surprisingly during the second night.
The well-known \quali cation" and \rami cation" problems concern additional ontological characteristics of CSR besides surprises. It appears that full CSR involves a considerable number of such di culties: not only surprises, quali cation, and rami cation, but also concurrent events, causation chains of events, creation and termination of objects, unreliable observations, and so forth. All of them represent challenges for a logic of common-sense reasoning. However none of the proposed theories gets even close to addressing all of these phenomena, although several of them propose to address more than one phenomenon by one single technical method. In particular, some of the proposed preference relations on models aspire to establish inertia, to minimize side-e ects (rami cation), and to minimize surprises all at the same time.
What I propose to do, therefore, is to introduce one de nition IA for strict inertia, a modi ed de nition IAS for inertia with surprises but without any of the other characteristics, and so on. Unlike the proposed theories, the de nitions of the various i should represent all the characteristics explicitly, so that one can clearly discern each of them.
This proposal has sometimes evoked impatience: why bother with a very simple case such as IA i.e. strict inertia, when other researchers have already thought about more advanced problems such as quali cation and rami cation? The answer is that the systematic assessment of a theory of action is considerably more complex than nding a few examples where it works, and the assessment is a non-trivial undertaking even for the case of strict inertia. One ought not have to apologize for the strategy of obtaining a solid analysis of the simple cases before one proceeds to the more di cult ones, even though one impatiently feels that the directly useful results will be found in the later stages of the process.
In this perspective, the reason for using the formal de nition IA corresponding to strict inertia is not that it is claimed to correspond exactly to common sense { it clearly does not { but because it is the rst step on a well structured path towards the goal of characterizing common sense reasoning; a goal which is very ambitious and which therefore we can not expect to achieve in the near future. For each choice i of the intended-models function, one obtains a well-de ned assessment problem for one or more proposed theories of action, and this is a problem that can be analyzed in an entirely formal fashion.
Although each intended-models function i is to be de ned in a formal fashion, the choice of that de nition for the purpose of CSR is properly outside the scope of formal methods. The traditional methodology in A.I. would leave it to the discretion of the researcher: everyone presumably knows what common sense is? One may speculate whether methods of cognitive psychology could be used for testing the psychological validity of one or the other intended-models functions, but that is not a topic of the present article.
1.3 A methodology for assessment of range of applicability Consider a given choice of ontological assumptions, in particular the case of strict inertia represented by its intended-models function IA , and consider also a proposed theory viewed as a selection function S. A direct validation of S with respect to IA will simply verify whether S( ) = IA ( ) for every chronicle that is correctly formed with respect to the chosen ontological assumptions, and the outcome will state whether S is or is not always correct. However even if S is not always correct one may be interested in its range of applicability, i.e. in a family Z of chronicles such that 2 Z ) S( ) = IA ( ). Such results which I will call assessments have a potential practical interest: it is not clear that a broader-range theory will always be preferred, since a theory with a more narrow range of applicability might allow a more e cient implementation. However in order to make use of it, one must have precise knowledge of whether it is correctly applicable for the application one has at hand. Range of applicability results have a theoretical interest as well: as we proceed to successive new de nitions i of the intended models, a selection function that agrees completely with one version i can by de nition not agree completely with the next one. An understanding of selection functions that are almost correct for one stage may therefore be useful for the next stage.
The range of applicability may be characterized in terms of various properties of the chronicle, for example whether it contains a nondeterministic action, whether it contains observations for time greater than zero, and so on. I will refer to such properties as sub-characteristics since they provide a ner-grain categorization in addition to the one that is obtained from the main characteristics for inertia, surprises, rami cation, etc. The collection of characteristics and sub-characteristics together constitute a taxonomy of 6 chronicles which may be used as the coordinate system for specifying and comparing the range of applicability of various theories of action.
Notice what is the logical order in which the various de nitions must be made:
1. De ne the reportoire of main characteristics.
2. Select some class of chronicles Z i in terms of the chosen main characteristics.
3. Choose a de nition of syntactic structure for chronicles in Z i . 4. De ne the underlying semantics for Z i , and in particular the selection function i from well-formed chronicles to their intended model-sets. 5. The underlying semantics is also used for the formal de nition of the sub-characteristics which generate a taxonomical structure within Z i . 6. Proposed theories of action for Z i are expressed as selection functions and are assessed with respect to the selection function i . The results are expressed in terms of the taxonomy de ned by the subcharacteristics. 7. Algorithms and other implementation aspects are developed for the theories that have been assessed. Each de nition of i is merely an approximation to real common sense.
When the theories and implementations for one choice of Z i is su ciently well understood, one proceeds to a more re ned class and repeats the process. One hopes of course that the analysis of a later class can make use of the results from earlier classes in the progression.
The present article summarizes some recent results in this research, and in particular it identi es the range of applicability of several of the previously proposed theories of actions with respect to strict inertia. In fact we obtain not only lower bounds but also upper bounds on the range of applicability, where the upper bounds identify regions where we can not even hope that a given theory will be correctly applicable. The previously published results are direct validations, and the possibility of range-of-applicability results is one of the contributions of the present approach.
By necessity the present article is fairly brief, and omits most of the proofs as well as some of the details in the de nitions. For the full account please refer to the much more detailed presentation in a forthcoming book 34], hereafter referred to as \the book". A preliminary version is available as a departmental technical report.
The base logic
Before proceeding to the underlying semantics I shall outline the syntax and semantics of the logic, called discrete uent logic, which will be used as the base logic. We consider rst the \propositional" case, and then generalize to the \ rst-order" case which allows multiple objects each having time-dependent properties. The latter is essentially a two-sorted rst-order logic, with \time-points" and \physical objects" as the two sorts. However I make certain modi cations relative to the standard, in order to obtain a system which is more natural for knowledge representation, and in order to facilitate the subsequent analysis. This discrete uent logic is the base logic so that several di erent theories of action will all use its syntax and classical semantics 1 , and only di er with respect to their preference relations or more generally their selection functions on models. Basic choices such as the use of explicit metric time are intrinsic to the base logic, and are the reason why I do not use situation calculus as the base logic instead.
The propositional main language
Conventional propositional temporal logic allows each proposition symbol to have a truth-value as a function of time. In DFL, proposition symbols are replaced by feature symbols each of which is associated with its own, nite set of possible values called its value domain. For example, the current direction of movement of a particular automobile may be represented using a value domain with three members, for \forward", \backward", and \standing still".
If cd is the feature for the direction of movement of this particular car, and the value domain for cd is chosen as fF; B; Sg with the obvious intended meanings, then the logic formula 620]cd= B will represent that the car is moving backward at time 620. Propositional features such as \alive" or \loaded" have the binary value domain fT; Fg, and p= T for a propositional feature is abbreviated simply as p.
The expression to the right of the= symbol can only be an explicit feature value; it is not allowed to be a variable or a composite expression. The reason for introducing these multi-valued features is that they are often very natural in knowledge representation, for example in the \discrete value spaces" of qualitative reasoning. for a given set of logic formulae in the main language is likewise de ned in the standard way as the set of all interpretations where all members of ? are true. The logic whose syntax and semantics has been outlined here will be referred to as the main language. One notices that the main language is not able to express statements about actions. Such statements are made in a separate action language.
The propositional action language
Actions are supposed to operate over intervals and are expressed using action symbols. The following is a simple example of an action statement in the propositional case.
530; 560]Open-door: The action characterized by this statement does not apply over subintervals or superintervals of 530; 560]. In general an action statement is formed by an expression for a closed temporal interval in the main language, followed by an action expression which in the present case is just an action symbol. Actions are not represented in the interpretations, and we shall return to their semantics in a while. 9 
The rst-order main language
Conventional treatments of rst-order logic make a point of strictly separating objects and constant symbols, so that objects may be values of constant symbols but may not themselves occur in the formulae. The point is of course to allow several constant symbols to refer to the same object, and to allow objects that are not named by any constant symbol. However many applications in A.I. proceed quickly to eliminating this variability of the object domain by introducing unique-names axioms and domain-closure axioms to guarantee that the object domain is isomorphic with the set of constant symbols. This is like paying for the cake and then throwing it away.
In DFL I use two disjoint sets of constant symbols for objects, called \object names" and \object constants", respectively. Unique-names axioms and domain-closure axioms (or the equivalent restrictions formulated in semantical terms) apply for object names but not for object constants. Thus if a particular chronicle uses the object names #1, #2, and #3 and the object constants o 1 through o 6 , then one assumes that #1, #2, and #3 are di erent objects, and that each member of the object domain is one of them. In particular, each of the o i must be equal to exactly one of #1, #2, and #3. The reason for this convention is that some temporal reasoning problems, for example TWEAK-style planning, require the choice of object to be postponed for as long as possible during the reasoning process, and formally such a choice of object will be represented as an object constant whereas its equality to one or the other object name is held open. (The symbol for the object-to-be-determined is called a \variable" in Chapman's article 4], but in the terms of logic is is better viewed as a constant). Object variables are written as o i for example o 4 , and are used for quanti cation as usual.
In the rst-order case a feature expression is a feature symbol followed by a (possibly empty) list of arguments, each of which must be an object name, an object constant, or an object variable. For example if dir is a feature with one argument indicating the direction of movement of its argument object, then 620]dir(#3)= B would express that object #3 is moving backwards at time 620. The signature (similarity type) for each use of the logic must therefore indicate the arity and the value domain for each feature symbol.
Since the set of object names is required to be isomorphic with the object domain, it is convenient to identify those two, and to assume that each object name is an object. The M component of an interpretation must therefore map temporal constants t i to non-negative integers, and object constants o i to object names #k. For the purpose of the R component, a feature is de ned as an expression formed by a feature symbol followed by a possibly empty list of arguments, each of which must be an object name. Thus dir(#3) is a feature but dir(o 3 ) is not.
A signature speci es the arity (number of arguments) and the set of possible values for each feature symbol. A signature and an object domain determine together a corresponding set of features, which will be denoted F. Thus the R component of the interpretation is always a mapping from F times non-negative integers, to corresponding feature values. The rule for determination of the truth of a formula in a given interpretation is straightforward.
Since we are using a strictly semantical approach, it is natural to bypass the use of unique-names and domain-closure axioms, and to use instead an index on the function for forming the model set. 
The rst-order action language
The action language is generalized to the rst-order case by allowing arguments for action symbols in the obvious ways. The following is an example of an action statement 530; 560]Paint(o 5 ; G); and may represent the action of painting the object o 5 with green color during the time interval from 530 to 560. An action designator is a term formed from an action symbol and its arguments, where all arguments are either object names (e.g. #5) or feature values (e.g. G), but not object constants such as o 5 .
The letter A will be used as a metavariable for action names, and E for action designators. Expressions will be quoted using Quine quotes 27]. For example we might have E = pPaint(#5;G)q. The full details of this syntax and semantics are given in the book.
3 Chronicles
Recall that a chronicle is a particular kind of scenario description which is used in the context of reasoning about actions and change. A chronicle will not be de ned as a single set of logic formulae, but as a tuple whose structure depends on the ontological family, and whose elements are sets of formulae or other syntactic entities. In the case of strict inertia, a chronicle is de ned as a fourtupe hO; ; scd; obsi, where O is a nite set of objects/object names f#1; #2; :::#kg to be used in interpretations e.g. when constructing features.
is a set of \laws" characterizing the e ects of actions. scd is a schedule i.e. a nite set of formulae characterizing the actions, chosen among the following two simple kinds: These constraints may seem disturbing from the point of view of classical logic: why not allow any kind of formulae anywhere? However the constraints are actually used for the assessments of applicability. This does not mean that the same constraints will be there forever, but only that one has to relax them gradually. Consider for example the case of composite action statements of the form which correspond to sequential composition and conditional expressions for actions. In order to account for chronicles containing such action statements one has to extend the underlying semantics and generalize the assessments of the entailment methods that have been proposed. The work has been done, in that particular case, but it was a nontrivial extension and it is not considered in the present article. Anyway, the examples of common-sense reasoning that have been used in the previous research are easily accomodated within the stated constraints.
Since the schedule contains both action statements and temporal constraints it can be viewed as a plan which speci es what to do and in what order. However its use is not restricted to planning future actions; it may also be used for describing past actions, which is why the term \schedule" was chosen. Notice that since the schedule is a nite set, it will only specify a nite number of actions. Since each action will in addition be assumed to have nite duration, it follows that in every intended model of the chronicle the changes are limited to a nite interval of time.
Notice also that although each chronicle commits to a particular choice of object domain, one will presumably wish to write the set of action laws so that it can be used for many di erent chronicles which may have di erent object domains. For example the action laws for moving blocks and for other actions in the blocks world are the same regardless of the number of blocks in the world. The binding of the object domain across models which was described above, is appropriate when reasoning about one particular chronicle, but not if one wishes to draw conclusions merely from the action laws and without reference to any particular chronicle. Consequently the object names in O may be used in the formulae in scd and obs, but not in the action laws .
Mnemonically, both the letters s and t will be used for timepoints, representing starting time and termination time of an interval or an action. This allows a set of action statements to be represented as s i ; t i ]E i for varying i. (Consequently I use r rather than s to represent states).
I will write (scd) for the result of replacing each action statement in scd by the e ects speci ed by the laws in . For example the e ect of loading the gun in the Yale Shooting Problem could be expressed as the following formula in : s; t]Load V t]l= T saying that if the gun-loading action takes place over the interval from s to t, then the feature for the gun being loaded is true (T) at time t. If scd has the member 4; 6]Load, (scd) would then in its place have the member 6]l= T. From a formal point of view, action statements are considered to be a separate language, and action laws in are rules for translating that language to the main language. The truth of scd in an interpretation hM; Ri is not de ned, since actions are not included in interpretations, but the truth of (scd) is de ned.
This treatment of the action laws has the advantage of simplifying the semantics and the preference relations on models. If actions were to be explicit objects in the logic then one would have to minimize both the set of actions and the set of changes resulting from the actions (Morgenstern and Stein 22]). Such a more powerful theory may in fact be necessary for expressing causation chains between events, or the credibility of actions or events, but that again would be a later development.
Underlying semantics
The underlying semantics has two related purposes: to de ne the function IA , and to de ne the subcharacteristics mentioned in subsection 1.3 and thereby the taxonomy of chronicles. For each chronicle = hO; ; scd; obsi, IA ( ) shall be a set of interpretations hM; Ri which represent those developments of the world which are in accordance with and with the assumption of strict inertia: if R(t) is considered as a function from time-points to states, then there shall be no changes over time in R except those which are explicitly speci ed by the action statements in scd and the corresponding action laws in . The de nition of IA should furthermore satisfy the following informal criteria: It should be intuitively natural from the point of view of common-sense reasoning.
It should be possible to relate it to the underlying, physical and quantitative world description that may be available in cognitive-robotics applications.
It should be straight-forward to generalize it later on to more complex characteristics of CSR, such as those involving surprises, quali cation, and rami cation. We rst de ne the underlying semantics for a broader ontological family IAD which allows certain types of rami cation, and then obtain the case of strict inertia by imposing a particular constraint on it.
Trajectory structures
Technically, the stated goals are achieved using constructs on two levels. On the more speci c level, each action is characterized using a set of trajectories. Each trajectory is a sequence of partial states representing the successive feature values in the a ected part of the world, during successive timepoints while the action is being executed. For example, the trajectory hfp : T; w : Fg; fp : T; w : Tgi represents performing an action in two timesteps, where after the rst timestep p is true and w is false, and after the second timestep both p and w are true.
This arises for example if the phone starts ringing (p) in the rst time-step and the person in the room becomes awake (w) in the second time-step.
All other features in F besides those that are de ned in the trajectory, are assumed to stay constant.
For each combination of an action designator E and a state r, the semantics identi es a set of trajectories, representing all possible ways of performing E if it starts at a time when the world in state r. This allows the outcome of the action to depend on the state of the world when the action starts, and it allows the action to be non-deterministic with respect to its duration, its nal outcome, and the intermediate states while it is being performed. For a given action and state of the world, all partial states in all the corresponding trajectories are required to be de ned over the same subset of F.
The construction of a history R, for a given chronicle and a given valuation M, is de ned using a game between an \ego" (corresponding to the \knowledge level" of an intelligent agent proposed by Newell in 23]) and a \world" that comprises its physical environment and the sensori-motoric system of the robot itself. This game represents the higher level construct above the level of the trajectories. It is reminiscent of the \agent model" of Genesereth and Nilsson 11].
The ego-world game
It is commonplace 1, 5, 36] to propose that intelligent robots should be designed with a layered architecture. Lower software layers receive input from the sensors, recognize patterns and properties of the world on a discrete level, and send them to the knowledge level, where they are used as the basis for prediction, planning, and other types of reasoning. The knowledge level is then able to invoke actions by emitting a request that a particular action is to be performed by lower layers of the architecture, which naturally use their sensory input for this purpose as well. In the simplest case the action is just treated as a subroutine that is allowed to run until it terminates, and in this case the knowledge level will not be engaged again until the action has been completed. The resulting history of actions will therefore be sequential. In less trivial cases the knowledge level may also interact with the execution of the action at some other speci c times, and supervise the execution of several concurrent actions. It should however be isolated from the continuous details of the actions. When actions are viewed in this way they have duration and internal structure, and this is the reason for our choice of base logic.
The \game" between ego and world in the underlying semantics is an abstract version of this architecture. The ego corresponds to the knowledge level; the world corresponds to the combination of the lower levels of the robot and its physical environment. Thus the interaction between ego and world consists only of (a) the world informing the ego about what has recently happened in the world, in particular as the result of actions that have been invoked by the ego; (b) the ego requesting the world to perform certain actions.
Formally, the ego and the world interact over nite developments, which are tuples hB; M; R; A; Ci. Here B is a nite set of timepoints (integers)
which accumulates the set of interaction times between the ego and the world. Its largest member n is referred to as the \now" of the ongoing game. M is a valuation like in interpretations. R is a history of the world from time 0 to time n, and formally a mapping from 0; n] to R. A is a set of actions which have been completed at time n, i.e. a set of triples hs; E; ti where s < t n and E is an action designator. Finally C is a set of actions which have been started but not completed at time n, represented as pairs hs; Ei where s n.
The interaction between the ego and the world is realized as a game where the two players alternate, and the moves consist of sucessively modifying and extending a nite development which serves as the \board" of the The ego-world game o ers a general framework which can be constrained in various ways in order to obtain particular types of systems. To begin with there are some minimal restrictions on W and K which assure that they are not able for example to run time backwards. In particular, the ego must leave the rst and third component of the development unchanged, so it can not change the setting of n (\now") at all. The moves of the ego are to add elements hn; Ei to C, meaning to invoke actions starting at the present now-time n, or to do nothing. The moves of the world are to increase n by adding more members to B, to extend R correspondingly, and to terminate actions. If the ego has invoked the action hn; Ei by adding it to C, then the world can terminate it at time n 0 > n by removing hn; Ei from C, adding n 0 to B, and adding hn; E; n 0 i as an additional member of A. If the ego has left C empty i.e. chosen to do nothing, then the world adds n+1 as a new member of B, causing \now" to be increased by one, and extends R according to R(n+1) = R(n).
It is straightforward to constrain the rules of the game so that the actions are sequential in all resulting developments: the agent is allowed to add at most one member to C, and the world must always remove that member in its moves. Concurrent actions are obtained if C is allowed to contain several members at the same time, and the ego and the world are allowed to add and delete members asynchronously. Only sequential actions will be considered here.
In this article the set B is only used for its largest member. However the full set plays a role in certain assessment proofs, which are induction proofs over the members of B, as well as in a generalization to branching time.
The use of trajectories in the ego-world game
The use of the trajectory semantics constitutes an additional specialization in the framework of the ego-world game. We proceed to the precise de nition of a world W with strict inertia, using the trajectory structures de ned in subsection 4. After this it is the ego's turn to make its move, which it does in the new situation where now is s+k. The case where C = ? when the world has the move, has already been de ned.
Several world descriptions may exhibit the same behavior, for the following reasons. Let hInfl; Trajsi be given and choose some E and some r such that Infl(E; r) F (strict subset relation). Add one more member f to Infl(E; r), and add the maplet f 7 ! r(f) to every partial state in every trajectory in Trajs(E; r). It is easily seen that the new world description exhibits exactly the same behavior as the given one { it just speci es the persistence of f explicitly rather than by default. In the limiting case where
Infl(E; r) = F for every E and r one does not rely on inertia at all.
Complete (in nite) developments are obtained as the limiting case of the game when time goes to in nity, and are characterized by R(t) being de ned for all non-negative t.
Locality of change
Locality of change is a restriction that avoids certain types of rami cation. It is also useful for the assessments since it makes it easier to relate a world description hInfl; Trajsi to a set of action laws. It is only applicable in the \ rst-order" case where features and actions may have objects as arguments; in the propositional case it is trivially satis ed. This means in particular that it is trivially satis ed in all the standard examples of common sense reasoning in the \frame problem" literature. E as the set of features all of whose arguments occur also as arguments of E, and we require for locality of change that Infl(E; r) shall be a subset of the range of in uence of E.
Secondly it is required that the e ects of the action do not depend on features outside its range of in uence. In other words if r and r 0 are two states whose restrictions to the range of in uence of E are equal, then Infl(E; r) = Infl(E; r 0 ) and Trajs(E; r) = Trajs(E; r 0 ).
Thirdly it is required that the e ects of an action are independent of the naming of the objects. Thus if one selects an arbitrary permutation of the object domain and applies this permutation throughout hInfl; Trajsi then one obtains back the same world description. This means concretely speaking that if one should wish the e ects of an action to depend on features of an object with a particular role (such as \the king") then one must not just set aside one object #i for that role. It becomes necessary to introduce a constant symbol for it, and to include that constant as an argument in one particular argument position of the action.
The combined e ect of these restrictions is to guarantee that Trajs(E; r)
can be characterized using a formula of nite size, which in turn is important for the assessment proofs.
Locality of change is related to the informal concept of rami cation in the \frame problem" literature. Some of the frequently cited examples of rami cation are \if alive ceases to be true, then dead ceases to be false", and \if alive ceases to be true, then walking ceases to be true". If several objects are being considered at once then one would of course write, in DFL notation, that if alive(o) changes its value then dead(o) changes its value.
Such constraints between features of one and the same object are compatible with locality of change. However dependencies such as \if a married man is killed, then his wife becomes a widow" involve features of another object than what is speci ed as an argument of the action, and can not be directly accomodated when locality of change is assumed.
Full trajectory normal form
The purpose of the world description hInfl; Trajsi is to represent the behavior of the world in a way which can be directly applied in the course of the ego-world game. It therefore corresponds to the action-law component of a chronicle. For a given chronicle hO; ; scd; obsi one wishes to consider the (unique) world corresponding to , and the set of games that can be played by that world.
One possible approach would have been to de ne the truth of a set of action laws in a world description hInfl; Trajsi. Unfortunately such an approach seems to require a fairly complex de nition of action-law syntax. where ' r is a formula of the form f 1= x 1^f2= x 2 :::^f n= x n ;
where again x i = r(f i ) for each i. Therefore ' r is a formula that exactly characterizes r as a possible starting state of the action. Similarly there is one expression r;i for each possible ending state r i of the action when r is the starting state. The expression r;i characterizes r i and the set of all trajectories in Trajs(A; r) that end in r i . For example if the action is deterministic for the given r then there is only one r;i . Constraints on the duration of the action and on the timing of various changes within its duration must be expressed by the various r;i . The direct transformation between trajectory sets and logic formulae is the starting point for the assessments of theories of actions in this framework, and for the purpose of those proofs it is very convenient to have the direct structural relationship between trajectory sets and action laws. On the other hand, the FTNF is useless from a practical point of view due to its bulkyness, so the resulting assessments would be vain if they only applied to those chronicles where the action laws are in fact expressed in FTNF. Fortunately there is no such restriction, because the action laws are only used for obtaining (scd)] ] i.e. for their models as applied to a particular schedule. The assessments are therefore equally applicable if the action laws are replaced by another version as long as the expressions to the right of the V operator is classically logically equivalent to the FTNF version.
When actions with object arguments are used then Trajs(E; r) will be de ned for an in nite number of action designators E, and possibly for an in nite number of states r, since the world description must apply for all possible choices of object domain. The locality of change assumption is important in this context for insuring that Trajs(E; r) for an in nite number of argument combinations can be described by a nite formula.
There are a number of additional technical details which will not be adressed here, such as the existence of the formula r;i when the corresponding set of trajectories has in nitely many members. Each trajectory is nite, but there need not be any upper bound on their lengths. Those topics are made precise in the book.
Intended models under the assumption of strong inertia
The de nition of the set IA ( ) of the intended models of with respect to strict inertia can now be nalized. It is assumed that = hO; ; scd; obsi is a correct chronicle for strict inertia, and the de nition proceeds as follows.
Select an arbitrary world W which is exactly described by . This is certainly possible since the action-law component was required to be equal to or logically equivalent to an FTNF expression, which in turn was de ned to be constructed from some world description hInfl; Trajsi. Select also an arbitrary ego K, an arbitrary initial state r 0 using O as its object domain, and an arbitrary initial valuation M 0 where object constants are mapped into O. for several statements to \share" one realization.
We notice that although this de nition uses the trajectory mechanism for de ning the behavior of the \world" side of the game, it does not directly de ne or restrict the \ego" side. There is only the posterior restriction that the action set A resulting from the game shall equal what is stipulated in the schedule part of the chronicle. In future extensions, some of the more complex characteristics of chronicles may require prior restrictions on the ego behavior as well. This may arise for example when one uses statements about the beliefs and behavior patterns of the ego, and is a topic for continued research.
The ontological and epistemological taxonomy
In order to assess and compare the range of applicability of various theories of action, one needs a common \coordinate system": a taxonomy of chronicles whereby one can specify where a theory is applicable and where it is not. It was proposed above to organize such a taxonomy using a distinction between main characteristics and sub-characteristics. Orthogonally we need a distinction between ontological and epistemological characteristics. Ontological characteristics refer to properties of the world which is described in the chronicle and which participates in the ego-world game. An example of such a property is whether actions are non-deterministic or not. Epistemological characteristics refer to assumptions about the description, for example whether there are any observations for time later than zero.
Ontological characteristics constrain the action laws and their interpretation. Epistemological characteristics constrain similarly the other three components of the chronicle { in themselves or in conjunction with the action laws. The term \characteristics" is used since the word \feature" is already being used for a category in the logic.
Main characteristics
The ontological characterization of classes of worlds uses sets of bold-face letters, where each letter indicates the presence of some characteristics. Strict inertia is denoted by IA, where I stands for inertia as such, and A for \al-ternative results": the results of an action are conditional on the starting state, for example when ring the gun in the Yale Shooting Problem. C represents that concurrent actions are allowed, L that actions may have delayed e ects (resulting in changes that occur after the period of the action itself), and so on.
The trajectory-based ego-world game that was de ned above without the restriction of locality will be denoted as IAD. The narrower ontological family IA corresponding to strict inertia is obtained by also imposing strict locality. The case without alternatives will be denoted by I.
Epistemological characteristics will use script letters. I use K to denote the basic assumption of full knowledge about actions, as de ned above.
Q will represent the weaker case that is often used in planning, namely that each action has a known precondition, and in case the precondition is satis ed there is full knowledge about the possible e ects of the action, otherwise not. The family of chronicles with speci ed epistemological and ontological characteristics will be represented by hyphen-joining the two characteristics, as in K-IA. Strict inertia in the frame problem literature is concerned with the K-IA family of reasoning problems. Classical planning algorithms such as TWEAK 4] are concerned with the Q-I family: the e ects of actions are only known if preconditions are satis ed, but in that case the e ects are not conditional on the starting state.
Sub-characteristics
In addition there is a need to introduce sub-characteristics which provide additional detail in the taxonomy and which will be written with a small letter. For example Is denotes the subfamily of I systems where all actions take a single time-step. Id denotes the subfamily where in every action and for every feature a ected by the action, the feature makes a single change from its old to its new value. IAd denotes the subfamily of IA where all 22 actions are deterministic, and so on.
All the sub-characteristics of IA can be precisely de ned in terms of the trajectory semantics. For example Is is characterized so that every member of Trajs(E; r) is a trajectory of length 1, for every E and r. Ad is characterized so that all members of Trajs(E; r) for given E and r have the same last element. The full catalogues of characteristics and subcharacteristics, with their exact de nitions, are in the book.
The assessment of a proposed theory of action is always done within the framework of a given (main) characteristics, according to the sequence of steps de ned in section 1.3. For example, given that K-IA has obtained a precise de nition, including a precise de nition of the intended set of models IA ( ) for any chronicle 2 K-IA, and given also a selection function S, one wishes to nd a set Z K-IA for which one can prove that every 2 Z satis es that IA ( ) = S( ). If it is known that the theory applies correctly for chronicles where all actions are deterministic and take a single time-step, then Z in the assessment is chosen as K-IsAd.
Corresponding to the ontological sub-characteristics, there is also a need for epistemological sub-characteristics. Ks represents that for each choice of M the initial state R(0) is completely determined by obs. Similarly Kp represents that there are no observations about any timepoint after the initial one. The combination of the last two conditions is written as Ksp.
Any given chronicle determines its own epistemological subcharacteristics. The particular epistemological subcharacteristics s and p depend only on the scd and obs components of the chronicle, but others such as c for \the chronicle is consistent" depend on the combination of all four components. The main epistemological characteristics, on the other hand, can not be identi ed from the chronicle itself; they express the assumptions that are intended to accompany the chronicle and to be used in its interpretation. For example, \all the actions have been explicitly speci ed here, so there are no actions other than those included in scd" is a main epistemological characteristics and not a sub-characteristics. 6 Assessments of some simple entailment methods
The following are the assessments of some previously proposed theories of action. Each of them is rst reformulated using the base logic i.e. the syntax and the surface semantics that were de ned above. After this reduction the theory is only characterized by its selection function S which maps chronicles to model sets. As has already been discussed, such a selection function will be said to be correct for a set Z K-IA of chronicles i S( ) = IA ( ) will therefore not have any intended models. However it may have some classical models, and any selection function which is de ned in terms of a preference ordering will then produce a nonempty set of selected models for it. A chronicle will be said to be safely sequential i the actions in its schedule scd occur sequentially according to any valuation M that satis es the timing statements in scd.
It is therefore reasonable to arrange that preference orderings are only applied to models of safely sequential chronicles. We observe that if is an arbitrary chronicle, it is easy to construct a safely sequential chronicle 0 such that 0 ] ] consists exactly of the sequential models in ] ]. The construction is obtained by adding appropriate temporal constraints to the schedule component of . It is hard to think of a way of achieving the same purpose using a preference relation on models.
It follows that the semantical method of model-preference is not suitable for the entire task of replicating IA . An entailment method is consequently de ned as a pair hG; Si where G is a syntactic transformation such as the one mapping to its safely sequential counterpart 0 , and S is a selection function i.e. a mapping from a chronicle to a set of models such that S( ) ] ]. We shall de ne and assess a number of such entailment methods, where the syntactic part in several cases only serves to obtain safely sequential chronicles, but in one case it performs other tasks as well. The base logic, G, and S are together a theory of action in the sense de ned initially. If hG; Si is an entailment method then S will be called its essential selection function and S(G( ))] will be called its full selection function.
The entailment method hG; Si is correct for Z i its full selection function is correct for Z. To prove this it is su cient to show that S is correct for the projection of Z by G, and that IA ( ) = IA (G( )). In particular if 24 G is the transformation that ensures safe sequentiality then it is su cient to show that S is correct for all safely sequential members of Z. This will be the form of all the assessment results that follow.
Some previously proposed entailment methods
The following proposition is a direct consequence of the de nitions of IA ( ) and ] ], and con rms our expectation with respect to classical and intended models. Anyway it has obtained its proper proof. An anonymous reviewer suggested that this observation might be due to the fact that the information about the action itself has been removed from the models, which would indicate a possible way of remedying the problem. Unfortunately this is not the correct diagnosis, for the following reason. We The complementary case of \weak abnormality" will be de ned and assessed in the next section. Among the various proposals for solving the Yale Shooting Problem, the proposal by Kautz 16] can easily be rewritten using our base logic as follows 2 , and will be called original chronological minimization, OCM. The breakset of I at time t is de ned as breakset(I; t) = ff j R(f; t-1) 6 = R(f; t)g i.e. the set of features which change value from time t-1 to time t. Then I ocm I 0 i M = M 0 and there is some timepoint t such that both 2 The present formulation treats positive and negated propositions symmetrically, and in that respect it is a modi cation of Kautz's actual proposal. I take this liberty since the proposal was only expressed in terms of an example. for all t < t, breakset(I; t) = breakset(I 0 ; t) breakset(I; t) breakset(I 0 ; t). The preference relation ocm We proceed now to the assessments for these methods. The proofs of the main results require a number of auxiliary concepts and lemmas, and can not be included here due to the space constraints. For the full proofs and for some ne points regarding the conditions, please refer again to the book.
Assessment of original chronological minimization
The following is a simple example of assessment of applicability.
Proposition 3 Original chronological minimization (OCM) is correct for
Ksp-IsAd.
Recall that Ksp-IsAd is the set of chronicles where the initial state is completely speci ed by obs for each choice of M, there are no observations for times other than 0, and all actions are deterministic and take a single step of time.
Proof Consider a Ksp-IsAd chronicle = hO; ; scd; obsi and some hM; Ri 2 ] ]. For this choice of M, R(0) must be the only state that satis es the observations for time zero, according to the epistemological assumptions. Since the actions are deterministic and take a single timestep there is exactly one intended model for the given M. Let I 0 = hM; R 0 i be that intended model. By proposition 1 it is a member of ] ]. It is easily veri ed that if another classical model with the same M has a smaller ( ) breakset for some t, then it has a larger one ( ) for some t 0 < t. Therefore I 0 2 S ocm ( ), so that all intended models are selected.
To prove that all selected models are intended, suppose there is also some other member I 00 = hM; R 00 i 2 S ocm ( ) which contains the same valuation M and which is not a member of IA ( ). Let t be the smallest timepoint where R 0 (t) 6 = R 00 (t). Clearly t > 0. The states R 0 (t) and R 00 (t) can not di er in any of the features a ected by an action ending in t, because then I 00 would not belong to ] ] since actions are assumed deterministic. But I 0 , being an intended model, does not change in any feature except those necessarily changed by an action. Therefore breakset(I 0 ; t) breakset(I 00 ; t) from which it follows I 0 ocm I 00 . This contradicts the assumption that I 00 2 S ocm ( ), which concludes the proof.
It is fairly easy to nd examples where the stated restrictions are violated, and where OCM does not obtain the intended set of models. However it is possible to strengthen this result by introducing another kind of subcharacteristics.
Preference-compatibility
Let hO; ; scd; obsi be a chronicle, let hInfl; Trajsi be the trajectorystructure counterpart of the action laws , and consider the set of trajectories Trajs(E; r) which characterizes all the possible ways of executing E from the starting state r. Let V k = Min( ocm ; V k ), for any V k that is constructed by a choice of E, r, and k. This requirement means that the preference relation ocm will not prefer any member of V k over any other. The analogous compatibility properties for PCM and PGM are de ned as well. Preference-compatibility plays a natural role in the assessment of a preferentialentailment method: since the set of trajectories is intended to characterize the set of possible ways of performing the action, we certainly do not wish a preference relation to prefer one of them over another. Lacking preferencecompatibility one loses not only completeness but also soundness, since some of the intended models may be lost. We therefore consider the di erent variants of preference-compatibility as subcharacteristics, on a par with \single-timestep", \deterministic", etc which were introduced above. The notation ocm] will be used for OCM-compatibility, so for example K-IsA ocm] is the family of OCM-compatible, single-timestep chronicles with strict inertia.
Another subcharacteristics, \equidurationality", is de ned as follows.
Let be a chronicle and let hInfl; Trajsi be the trajectory-semantics description of the action laws in . Let
Pdur(E; r) = flength(v) j v 2 Trajs(E; r)g i.e. the set of possible durations (expressed as the number of elements in the trajectory) when the action designator E is invoked from the starting state r. A world description is equidurational for an action designator E i Pdur(E; r)
is independent of r. is equidurational, and has the subcharacteristics IAe, i its world description is equidurational for all E.
The new taxonomical concepts make it possible to obtain stronger assessments than the previous ones. It is clear for example that Ksp-IsAd Ksp-IA ocm]; since the set V k used above will have at most one member if E is deterministic and takes a single timestep. It may be di cult to get a good intuition for what preference-compatibility means, but the following behavior, called orchestration, is one way of looking at it. Let Infl, Trajs, E, r, and k > 0 be given. For every feature f in Infl(E; r) there shall be a set N f 1; k] i.e. a set of integers such that, in any trajectory in Trajs(E; r) of length k, the value of f changes exactly at the times indicated by N f .
This means that the time(s) of change for a given feature within the action are uniquely determined by the chosen duration of the action, so it is the same in all members of V k . It means in particular that the action may nondeterministically change the feature f to one value or another, but it may not make a nondeterministic choice between changing or not changing the value of f. Also it may not be nondeterministic about when the value changes. A concrete special case as an example is if one feature f 1 always changes its value in the rst timestep of the action while another one, f 2 , always changes its value in the last timestep of the action. If hInfl; Trajsi satis es these conditions for each choice of E, r, and k then we shall say that it is locally orchestrated. Local orchestration is a su cient condition for OCM-compatibility, but not a necessary one.
We state without proof an improved assessment for OCM using these concepts. The proof is found in the book.
Assessment of prototypical chronological minimization
The assessment of prototypical chronological minimization (PCM) is expressed immediately in terms of preference-compatibility.
Proposition 5 Prototypical chronological minimization (PCM) is correct
for Kp-IAe pcm].
For the proof, please refer to the book. Comparing with OCM, we have been able to drop the requirement of determinism and that the initial state must be completely determined. It is also easy to verify that any OCMcompatible chronicle is PCM-compatible. At this point the proven range of applicability of OCM is therefore a subset of the range for PCM. However these assessments are only lower bounds. We return to upper bounds in a later section.
The analysis of Lin and Shoham, which used another methodology (compare section 1), considered the Kp-IsAd family of reasoning problems, and they proved that PCM is correct for that family. The present result for PCM con rms and generalizes theirs.
Assessment of prototypical global minimization
The assessment of prototypical global minimization (PGM) requires some additional sub-characteristics. A world described by hInfl; Trajsi is said to be PGM-perfect i it satis es the following requirement. Let v 2 Trajs(E; r) and v 2 Trajs(E; r) be trajectories of the same length and for the same E but not necessarily the same starting state. This condition means that delay actions (having no e ect except the passage of time) and toggle-type actions are allowed. A simple deterministic action such as loading the gun (if the gun was unloaded it becomes loaded, if it was already loaded then nothing happens) is not PGM-perfect. PGM-perfection requires the kind of orchestration that was described for preference-compatibility above, but it must be applied globally across varying r, and not only locally for each speci c choice of r.
Secondly we introduce an additional epistemological subcharacteristics as follows. A chronicle is said to be pointwise consistency-retaining i hM; Ri The requirement of PGM-perfection is a very strong one, but assessment of upper bounds has shown that it is not possible to improve very much on it.
7 Theories of action using occlusion and ltering
The theories of action that were assessed in the previous section were already known to fail fairly easily, and the new results give a precise form to that insight. In order to obtain a theory that gives correct results for a larger class of chronicles while still retaining the preferential character, one must nd alternatives to the straightforward selection functions the form 
Filtering
Filtering treats the premise sets scd and obs separately, and de nes the selected set of models as
so that the minimization is imposed \before" the observations. If the preference relation is chosen as pcm then one obtains prototypical chronological minimization with ltering (PCMF), de ned by the essential selection Recall that PCM is correct for Kp-IAe pcm], i.e. for equidurational and PCM-compatible chronicles where all observations are for time 0. The introduction of ltering in PCMF removes the third one of those restrictions. In the case of PGM, ltering does not particularly improve the range of applicability.
Occlusion
Occlusion is a formal device for identifying when a feature is liable or \au-thorized" to change, in particular as the result of the action, and regardless of whether it actually changes or not. In this way one can eliminate the restriction of preference-compatibility.
Occlusion can be understood as a re nement of the usual abnormality concept as applied to the frame problem. Already McCarthy in his 1984 article proposed to use an axiom for \no change without abnormality", which can be written as follows in situation-calculus notation :Ab(f; A; s) ) (Holds(f; s) , Holds(f; Result(A; s))); and which says that if a feature is not abnormal (with respect to inertia) in a situation then its value must be unchanged there. Correspondingly in our logic, abnormality would be associated with time-points, and the nochange axiom takes the form of the axiom schema
where is a meta-variable. This axiom schema is used in conjunction with the minimization of Ab. Since it applies for any one can replace , by ). Now suppose an action has the e ect of changing the value of a speci c feature f. The action law must specify the new value of f, but various proposals in the literature di er with respect to whether the abnormality itself shall be explicitly implied in the action law. The following is an example of an action law where the implication is explicit s; t]A ) s+1 = t^ t]f= G^ t]Ab(f); 32 and the following is a law where abnormality is not explicitly speci ed:
The McCarthy proposal of 1984 used explicit implication of abnormality, and Hanks and McDermott followed his proposal, but already Kautz in 1986 made the opposite choice. This does not make any di erence if the world and the formulation of the action laws are such that abnormality only arises when change actually occurs. In this case the nochange axiom schema may be replaced by
without a ecting the set of selected models. This case has been called strong abnormality. The opposite case using explicit implication of weak persistence-abnormality has other properties, and this is what I call occlusion in order to have a shorter name. Note by the way that abnormality can be used for other purposes besides for inertia.
One of the interesting aspects of occlusion is that it makes it possible to have two levels of abnormality. Whereas the nochange axiom stipulates that there can be no unoccluded (abnormal) changes, one may instead use a selection function where unoccluded changes are minimized rather than forbidden. Unoccluded changes are then the changes that are not stated by the action laws. This alternative is of interest for broader classes than K-IA, since di erent types of changes require di erent treatment. For examples, changes due to the regular e ects of actions may be minimized chronologically, whereas \surprises" should be minimized non-chronologically. However within K-IA it does not matter much whether unoccluded changes are minimized or restricted by nochange axioms.
In brief, the occlusion concept provides a way of characterizing and reasoning about those combinations of features and temporal intervals where strict inertia does not apply.
From the point of view of the underlying semantics, the occlusion information is the same as is expressed by the Infl component in the trajectory semantics. It requires the following modi cation of the base logic. Interpretations are extended from hM; Ri to hM; R; Xi where X representing occlusion is a relation over features times timepoints. An action law saying that a feature f possibly changes its value over an interval of time s; t], is now expressed as saying that f is occluded throughout (s; t]. For example the action law for tossing the coin as a single-timestep action will just state that the action takes a single timestep, and that the position of the coin is occluded at the end of the action. For actions where the behavior of occluded features is not entirely random, the action law speci es constraints on their development as well.
The occlusion operator is therefore allowed to be used in the action laws, whereby it also appears in (scd), but not in the set of observations obs.
The de nition of the classical model operator :] ] is modi ed so that ] ] is now a set of triples hM; R; Xi, and the de nition of correctness for a selection function is changed accordingly so that it requires Ci(S( ] ])) = IA ( ), where Ci(W ) = fhM; Ri j hM; R; Xi 2 Wg. In this way the occlusion component X can be used by the preference relations, but not in the intended conclusions from the chronicle. Note that proposition 2 does not apply after these rede nitions.
The syntax for referring to the occlusion predicate X in action laws will be indicated through an example; the general formulation can be found in the book. Suppose the action A always takes three steps of time, and it a ects the propositional features p and q. If both p and q are initially true, A causes p to become false somewhere during the interval, and q may possibly become false in the last time-step but is certainly true before then. 
Chronological minimization of occlusion and change
An entailment method that chronologically minimizes occlusion and change together, and which also uses ltering, is de ned as follows. It will be referred to as chronological minimization of occlusion and change, CMOC. Let hO; ; scd; obsi be a chronicle in K-IA, and let I = hM; R; Xi and I 0 = hM 0 ; R 0 ; X 0 i be two models for (scd), both having O as their object domains. De ne a modi ed breakset function as brs(I; t) = ff j R(f; t-1) 6 = R(f; t)^:X(f; t)g i.e. as the set of features having unoccluded changes at time t. Then the preference relation cmoc is de ned so that I cmoc I 0 i M = M 0 and there is some timepoint t such that both of the following hold: For all t < t, R(t) = R 0 (t) and X(t) = X 0 (t).
Either of the following holds: { X(t) X 0 (t) { X(t) = X 0 (t)^brs(I; t) brs(I 0 ; t), where X(t) = ff j X(f; t)g. The set of selected models is de ned using ltering, with the essential selection function S cmoc = Min( cmoc ; (scd) 
We have proved Proposition 8 CMOC is correct for K-IAe.
In fact the minimization will result in empty breaksets at all points in time.
Comparing to PCM and PCMF, we have now eliminated the requirement of PCM-compatibility, and only the requirement of equidurationality remains. For an example of why equidurationality is required, see the proof of proposition 12.
The CMOC method was tested against a set of test examples, which contains or subsumes most problems that have been used by other authors in the eld, and it passed all the tests. However when attempting to prove the correctness of this entailment method for K-IA it was discovered that it is in fact not completely general, and the correct assessment is that CMOC is correct for K-IAe chronicles.
The use of occlusion and ltering together therefore allows to eliminate two of the three constraints on the applicability of PCM within the K-IA family of chronicles. The remaining constraint, equidurationality, is unfortunately a quite damaging one: certainly if you allow actions to have conditional e ects depending on the starting state and you allow them to have a duration di erent from 1, you would expect that the duration of the action may depend on the starting state. Of course if the duration of actions is not being described, as in situation calculus, then this restriction is trivially satis ed.
Chronological assignment and chronological minimization of occlusion and change
It is possible to correct the remaining problem of CMOC and to obtain a chronological entailment method which gives the correct results throughout K-IA. The revised entailment method, CAMOC, is characterized by an additional syntactic restriction and a modi cation of the preference relation. The syntactic restriction can be met using a slightly more complex syntactic transformation before the essential selection function is applied. The syntactic restriction is as follows. M 0:t = f( 7 ! t) j ( 7 ! t) 2 M^t tg where as usual a valuation is a set of pairs ( 7 ! t) consisting of a constant symbol and a timepoint (integer) t. This operation is a restriction on a function to a restricted value range, not to a restricted argument range. The preference relation camoc is then de ned as follows: I camoc I 0 i there is some timepoint t such that all of the following hold:
M 0:t = M 0 0:t . for all t < t, R(t) = R 0 (t) and X(t) = X 0 (t).
Either of the following holds: { X(t) X 0 (t) { X(t) = X 0 (t)^brs(I; t) brs(I 0 ; t).
The set of selected models is de ned using ltering with the essential selection function S camoc = Min( camoc ; (scd) 
We have proved Proposition 9 CAMOC is correct for K-IA.
The intuition behind the preference relation camoc is that the values of timepoints should not be assigned all at once, for example in the initial valuation M 0 of the game between ego and world. Instead, if a schedule speci es an action as s i ; t i ]E i , then the constant symbol s i should be assigned the current value of now when the ego decides to invoke the action, and the constant symbol t i should be assigned the current value of now when the world has concluded the action. This makes sense since the actual duration of the action is a consequence of the choice of trajectory within
Trajs(E; r); a choice which is made by the world in the ego-world game. The assessment of GMON uses the following subcharacteristics. A chronicle is said to have uniform change and belongs to K-IAu i Infl(E; r) = Infl(E; r 0 ) for all E, r, and r 0 . This condition means that the set of features for which an action law speci es the changes, is independent of the starting state. This characteristics is not only a property of the world itself (the player in the ego-world game), but also of how the action laws are written. For example in the Yale Shooting Problem, Hanks and McDermott characterized the e ects of ring the gun so that \if the gun is red when loaded then in the resulting situation Fred is dead and the aliveness of Fred is abnormal". (I omit the e ect on the loadedness of the gun). This formulation of the action law does not satisfy uniform change. However the law can also be expressed as follows: \If the gun is red then the aliveness of Fred is abnormal; if the gun was loaded then Fred results being dead, and if the gun was not loaded then the aliveness of Fred is retained". This formulation of the action law satis es uniformity. We have proved Proposition 10 GMON is correct for Kr-IAu.
The actual result in the book uses a concept of GMON-perfection similar to PGM-perfection, and the uniformity requirement is a special case. The corresponding method of ltered global minimization of occlusion with no unoccluded change or GMONF is de ned by the following selection function S gmonf ( ) = Min( gmon ; (scd) 
where nch is as before. We have proved Proposition 11 GMONF is correct for K-IAu.
Clearly any action law can be rewritten in uniform form, and often it does not grow very much in size as a result. The approach does however presume weak abnormality. It follows that the nonmonotonic entailment method that was proposed by McCarthy and used with negative results by Hanks and McDermott, is actually correct for the Yale Shooting Problem if the action laws are written in uniform form. It follows also that with the simple modi cation of ltering, the same method is correctly applicable for all chronicles with strict inertia provided that action laws are written in uniform form. These observations are somewhat surprising in view of the great attention that has been given to the YSP over the years. 8 Upper bounds on range of applicability The assessments in the previous sections obtain lower bounds on the range of applicability. It is natural to also look for corresponding upper bounds for the same entailment methods. Ideally one would like to know that a certain chronicle family is both a lower bound and an upper bound, so that no additional improvement of the result is possible.
The concept of upper bound however deserves some consideration. The simplest de nition would be that Z K-IA is an upper bound on the range of applicability for an entailment method whose main selection function is S i IA ( ) 6 = S( ) for any 2 K-IA ? Z. This is however a fairly useless de nition, since there are often a number of cases where an entailment method so to say accidentally obtains the intended models. The only exception so far is for pointwise consistency-retention: entailment methods such as PCM which use straight preferential minimization (without ltering), and where the preference relation only compares models with equal the ontological characterization is only based on the properties of the world, which is speci ed by the action laws . In other words, if we are building a robot that is to operate in an equidurational world, then the entailment method CMOC will obtain the correct conclusions in all the chronicles that can arise, and if the world is not equidurational then there are some chronicles in the world where CMOC will obtain the wrong conclusions. In that sense of upper bound on range of applicability, the lower bound and the upper bound that we have obtained are equal. where j = and with some additional constraints. The exact upper bound in the epistemological dimension may be the topic of further research.
The assessment results for these entailment methods are summarized in table 1 assum]. For each entailment method the table indicates the assessment that has been stated here, whether that assessment is ontologically maximal, and whether it is epistemologically maximal. The code pgm ? ] stands for PGM-perfect.
The rst four entailment methods in the table represent methods that do not use occlusion whereas the last four use occlusion. Since the methods in the latter group clearly have a broader range of applicability, one may wonder whether the rst group has any advantages besides the hypothetical e ciency advantage in implementations. One possible advantage occurs in the context of rami cation. As long as all e ects of an action are directly stated in its action law, it is no disadvantage to have to state occlusion explicitly, and often one can easily accept to write the uniform action laws required by GMON. However if e ects are also stated implicitly using domain constraints, then it becomes much less straightforward to also express how occlusion can be implied by those domain constraints. On the other hand if the domain constraints do not imply occlusion as well, then the range of applicability reverts presumably to what has been obtained in the rst group of entailment methods. Note however that this discussion is merely speculative, and that at this point we do not even have a precise de nition of intended models in the presence of rami cation. 9 Additional results Section 1.3 proposed a strategy for systematic research on ontology-speci c entailment methods. The present paper has described the general approach and the rst generation of results that have been obtained with it. It is intended to use these results as the basis for the continued work. The following results are already complete and are described in the book 34]: Lower-bound and upper-bound assessments for additional entailment methods, including one method (PMON) using the action schema nch which is correctly applicable throughout K-IA without requiring action laws to be written in uniform form. The assessments in this paper have been concerned with a completeness criterion, requiring equality between intended models and selected models. In some cases one may be content with a soundness criterion, only requiring the relation. Soundness assessments for a number of entailment methods are obtained as a by-product of the completeness assessments.
A generalization of the time domain from integer time to metric branching time. It means in particular that actions theories based on the situation calculus are subsumed by these results. A generalization to the case where action statements in schedules may be formed using sequential composition, conditional expressions, and while-loops. In a related project, Doherty and Lukaszewicz 8, 9] have provided a syntactic characterization of most of these entailment methods in terms of generalized-pointwise and second-order circumscription. It appears that the resulting representations are further translatable to logic programs using the method of Gelfond and Lifschitz 10] . This could be an essential step towards e cient implementations of these entailment methods. Karlsson 13] has modi ed the underlying semantics to apply for the Q epistemological assumption, where the e ects of an action are only known when its precondition is satis ed, and using it he has veri ed the TWEAK planning algorithm 4]. Work on other extensions is in progress.
Related work
In section 1.1 we mentioned some other approaches to the validation of theories of action and change, and related them to the work reported here. Many other theories of action have been proposed besides those that have been assessed at present. Several of them have di culty with what may loosely be called disjunctions, i.e. when the initial state is incompletely speci ed or when non-deterministic actions are allowed. A summary and analysis of a number of proposals is found in 31, 35] . An assessment of the range of applicability of such previously proposed approaches would be of considerable interest.
Many of the previously proposed entailment methods claim to solve a broader range of common-sense reasoning problems, particularly the rami cation problem and/or the quali cation problem. Correct handling of surprises, as in the stolen car problem, is also often considered to be a part of the general \frame problem". The Motivated Action Theory of Morgenstern and Stein 22] addresses causal chains between actions or events. In order to assess entailment methods of these kinds, it would be necessary rst to de ne the underlying semantics and the set of intended models for the additional ontological characteristics that are being introduced. It appears, not surprisingly, that it is much easier to propose new and promising theories of action, than to analyze their properties in a systematic fashion.
Finally a note on the competitive viewpoint which has dominated the present eld of research at least since 1985. Each author has advanced his or her own theory of action, and defended it by pointing out its virtues and the limitations of other, \competing" approaches. This was a natural consequence of the prevailing methodology, but it does not seem to have moved the eld very much forward.
The systematic methodology changes the perspective. Once a theory of action has been studied carefully enough so that its range of applicability is known, there are two ways of using the results. One may use it as a basis for continued theoretical study, but then there is no reason to force a choice. If two theories both obtain exactly the intended set of models for a given class of chronicles, then they are equivalent and therefore exchangable. Both can be used as tools for continued study.
On the implementation side, it is anyway unlikely that a general purpose theorem-prover for any of the proposed theories would have adequate eciency. Regardless of which model preference relation or which additional axioms (for example in explanation closure) are used in the theory, one must nd special-purpose data structures or other computational devices which capture the essence of time, change, and inertia, and which contribute to good computational properties. It is an open question whether those computational constructs can best be seen as implementations of model minimization, or of explanation closure axioms, or both.
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The work reported here has bene ted greatly from discussions and comments from colleagues and students working on the same topic, namely Patrick Doherty, Witold Lukaszewicz, Lars Karlsson, Hua Shu, and Choongho Yi. The group's research is supported by the funding agencies TFR and NUTEK. Our participation in the Esprit projects \DRUMS II" and \Logic and Change" has also contributed to the work described here. The constructive comments of the Journal's reviewers are likewise acknowledged. The later part of the work on this article was done during a stay at LAAS-CNRS in Toulouse, France, thanks to a grant from the CNRS.
